Tottenham 0 Arsenal 1: tactical analysis

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Any win in a north London derby is welcome for the victors, but Arsenal’s victory here at Tottenham was particularly pleasing for the visiting side. Missing first-team regulars Martin Ødegaard and Declan Rice, Mikel Arteta’s team nonetheless put in a clinical, determined display to ensure they took three points. It was a game in which Tottenham had plenty of possession, but could not find a way to pierce Arsenal’s solid set-up.

Under the guidance of set-piece coach Nicolas Jover, Arsenal were the Premier League’s most prolific converters of set-pieces last season, scoring 22 goals (excluding penalties). Spurs, by contrast, conceded 16 goals from set-pieces in the last campaign. So it was perhaps no surprise when Arsenal defender Gabriel rose to power home a header on 64 minutes, losing Cristian Romero as he decisively met Bukayo Saka’s corner. Arteta is now the first Arsenal manager to win three consecutive league games away at Tottenham since George Graham in 1988.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have dug deeper into the tactics behind the victory.

How the managers saw it

“We’ve controlled the game, we’ve played in the right areas, we just didn’t execute again in that final third like we should have,” said Tottenham manager Ange Postecoglou. “We had some good chances, we had opportunities to create more good chances. And then we switched off for a set-piece, and you pay the price.”

“We had moments in the game, some really good ones, some others that we have to suffer,” said Arteta. “We suffered because we have to adapt a little bit the plan because of the players we had available. I wanted to press much higher, lose the ball in much better conditions, higher up the pitch. What I didn’t want to do – with certain players that we had missing today – is expose ourselves to a game that they [Tottenham] are incredibly good at.”

Spurs against Arsenal’s low block

Tottenham’s 4-3-3 included a very attacking front unit, with James Maddison and Dejan Kulusevski in the central spaces ahead of single pivot Rodrigo Bentancur. Brennan Johnson and Pedro Porro attacked from the right, with Son Heung-min and Destiny Udogie on the left. Dominic Solanke operated as the single centre-forward, against Arsenal’s compact, out-of-possession 4-4-2 low block.

Spurs initially tried to connect through the centre, often forcing attacks against a particularly narrow Arsenal midfield. The home side maintained width through Son and Johnson, with their full-backs supporting slightly inside (below). But they failed to make the inside-channel runs to expose Ben White and Jurriën Timber when the Arsenal full-backs pressed their wingers, with Maddison in particular sat deeper than the hosts perhaps needed him.

Unable to penetrate the Arsenal block, Maddison’s position deepened further. The double pivot he effectively formed with Bentancur helped cover central areas against any Arsenal counter-attack, but it meant one of Tottenham’s best attackers between the lines was very deep (below).

The hosts used more players on their right side, with Kulusevski remaining between the lines for longer, and Cristian Romero stepping in from right centre-back. This briefly left Timber exposed, but Spurs lacked the delivery to create. Instead, they were most dangerous when Arsenal made errors in their build-up.

Arsenal pressed higher for a period in the second half, but reverted back to a low block after taking the lead. Postecoglou responded by making changes, bringing on Timo Werner and Wilson Odobert in the wide areas. This allowed Son to narrow, but to little effect as Arsenal’s appetite to defend – evident in their wingers’ work rates – was outstanding.

Although limited in attack, Arsenal’s narrow midfield helped protect the back line. The wingers were rarely caught outside of the ball, and instead often protected the inside shoulder of their full-back. The Gunners’ front-line pairing positioned themselves deep to offer extra central cover; this allowed the pivots to severely reduce the space between the lines (below).

Arsenal’s directness

With the ball, Arsenal converted into a 4-2-3-1 from their 4-4-2 low block. Throughout the first half they focused on defending deep, and were happy to operate with reduced possession. The visitors simply played for territory and set-pieces, looking to counter-attack from deep in the opening 45 minutes. In the few moments they attempted to build, they were caught out. As a result, they swiftly reverted to a direct build-up.

The wide areas were key to Arsenal, as they looked for runs beyond from Saka and Gabriel Martinelli (below). Leandro Trossard moved wide, to link with and support their penetrative runs. In midfield, Jorginho and Thomas Partey rarely advanced forward, instead ready to land on any second balls the front line failed to secure.

Kai Havertz was Arsenal’s main target with their direct play. He dropped away from the Spurs centre-backs to flick on or secure the ball. Trossard supported underneath, with the double pivot rarely moving ahead. Whichever side Arsenal targeted, the opposite winger narrowed to get inside the Tottenham centre-back who hadn’t engaged Havertz. This allowed for penetration beyond; should Havertz successfully win the first contact, the winger closest to him was a threat on the outside (below). While this direct play failed to yield good chances, it did help Arsenal progress up the pitch. This reduced Tottenham’s momentum and helped them win dangerous set-pieces.

Arteta’s tweaks

In the second half, Arsenal went less direct and attempted to build more with short passes. Havertz dropped very deep – almost attacking as a number eight – as Partey and Jorginho readjusted. With Spurs attempting to press high, Arsenal drew in their front line, which in turn meant one of Tottenham’s full-backs jumped to support the press. Trossard’s movements worked opposite to Havertz, with Martinelli and Saka further stretching Spurs’ back line of three. Underlapping runs from Timber on Arsenal’s left then exploited Porro’s high positioning on the Tottenham right (below), allowing the visitors to progress the ball into dangerous areas.

The positioning of Havertz in the second half also involved dropping into the right inside channel, with Partey and Jorginho again readjusting. When the Spurs back line was set, and not drawn in to support a high press, Havertz delayed his dropping. When he did drop, he pulled his centre-back marker with him, again creating gaps for Arsenal to exploit. However, White’s more reserved performance on Arsenal’s right didn’t complement these movements as much as Timber’s did on the left, thus limiting any right-sided attacks.

Gabriel’s goal duly gave Arsenal a platform to revert to a low block, as they no longer looked to rotate and play more expansively. It was a statement win by Arteta’s team, and a confidence boost ahead of their next Premier League game. That, of course, is the small matter of a visit to their recent nemesis, Manchester City.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice