Coaches' Voice

Manchester United were beaten 3-0 at home in the Premier League for the second time in succession, with Tottenham the gleeful victors on this occasion. Both sides went into the game in mid-table, but this win lifted Ange Postecoglou’s Spurs to within three points of fourth place after six fixtures. For Erik ten Hag and Manchester United, it was a shambolic display that will only increase the pressure on manager and team, after a poor start to their league campaign.

Tottenham were excellent value for their victory. They took the lead after three minutes through Brennan Johnson, after centre-back Micky van de Ven had been able to run from deep inside his own half to assist. Manchester United’s task was made harder when captain Bruno Fernandes was sent off shortly before the break, but by then they could and should have been further behind.

Dejan Kulusevski duly doubled Spurs’ lead almost immediately after the break. Despite a second-half spell in which United’s 10 players showed some endeavour, a Dominic Solanke finish rounded off the scoring.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the tactics from this rather one-sided game…

How the managers saw it

“It was clear we started the game very poor,” said Ten Hag. “Then concede a goal from a counter-attack where a centre-half is crossing the whole pitch…

“From that point on, we are very stressful in the game and in possession. We didn’t find the spare man in the switch, bad decision-making, we couldn’t keep the ball, not aggressive enough or to play around with third-man actions, too many ball losses and also we didn’t get the press right. Then the red card, we are downsized and it also has a big impact in the game.”

“From the first minute we were at it,” said Postecoglou. “Really aggressive without the ball, positive with the ball, won our duels, aggressive in everything we did. I’m just super-proud of the boys’ efforts. Their red card is a consequence of our dominance, we put them under so much pressure, they couldn’t really get out of their half.”

Central-midfield overload for Spurs

Tottenham’s 4-3-3 shape immediately overloaded Manchester United’s 4-4-2 defensive shape, with James Maddison and Kulusevski very fluid in their individual movements. Whenever United’s front line narrowed to screen access into pivot Rodrigo Bentancur, Maddison dropped out of the central spaces to receive freely (below). From there, he could combine with the centre-backs and narrowing full-backs to easily build around United’s block. With time on the ball, Maddison also began to connect with the high and wide wingers, pinning United’s back line.

This quality possession continued for Spurs, with full-backs Pedro Porro and Destiny Udogie narrowing much earlier to provide more central passing options around United’s two deeper central midfielders. This eventually dragged Marcus Rashford and Alejandro Garnacho inside, limiting the central access Tottenham had to combine. But it also opened passing lanes from the centre-backs and Bentancur into wingers Brennan Johnson and Timo Werner. The latter pair’s pace and direct dribbling helped Spurs attack around United’s unconvincing 4-4-2 block, with Maddison – now positioned higher within the left inside channel (below) – becoming a key creative threat in the final third. Spurs managed 12 first-half shots, although they only managed to score once.

In addition to their quality on the ball, Tottenham’s high press was very effective in limiting the opposition’s build-up. Solanke locked the play one way, forcing United’s centre-backs to play around. Tottenham’s full-back and winger pairings then jumped, to duel near the touchline. When United worked the ball inside, aiming to utilise Dalot’s inverting movements from left-back, Kulusevski and Maddison pressed on to United’s deepest central options. Bentancur plus one of Spurs’ centre-backs then supported the central press (below), which did leave plenty of space behind. They were fully committed to the high press, though, which was more often than not successful.

United go direct to the wide areas

The home side’s build-up play was so poor that they were unable to beat the high press with any consistency. As such, they soon targeted wide areas, via direct long balls from the back and from midfield regains, to instigate quick and direct counter-attacks. Garnacho and Rashford looked to attack the space behind Tottenham’s very high line, driving at their opponents to get into the final third as efficiently as they could. When United regained possession in the middle third, the inverting Spurs full-backs also gave the home side’s wingers ideal space to run into. Indeed, this was United’s only real outlet for most of the first half.

United struggled to play through a Spurs midfield that was particularly compact. As such, switches of play helped find their wingers, to attack the opposing full-backs 1v1 (below). Although this did help progress the ball up the pitch – and led to Rashford crossing for Garnacho to hit the post – United lacked numbers in attack. Their deeper passing was so unconvincing that they required extra players to drop deep, in order to keep the ball long enough to be able to work an accurate switch of play. This naturally meant fewer numbers high up the pitch to attack Tottenham’s back line. It was damning that the only other noteworthy chance for Ten Hag’s team in the first period came when Spurs were briefly down to 10 players, due to an Udogie injury.

United were reduced to 10 players following Fernandes’ challenge on Maddison. Instead of sitting in a low block, though, they committed to defending relatively high. Mason Mount was added to their front unit, where he pressed alongside Rashford and Garnacho. With just Casemiro and Manuel Ugarte then covering between and into the wide areas, Tottenham’s back line expanded to play around and drag United across the pitch. Bentancur dropped into the back line when needed, to further stretch United’s attempted press and enable Spurs to find their spare central midfielder to switch the play (below). It wasn’t long before they scored a crucial second goal.

United did find some momentum to attack at 2-0 down, despite being a player short. But Tottenham regained composure on the ball – and control – as they began to switch play around United again. Maddison, Werner and substitute Djed Spence attacked as a trio on the left, fluidly rotating to exploit around United’s right side.

On the Spurs right, Bentancur moved across, joining Porro and Johnson to provide similar support and attacking patterns to those seen on the left. United continued to defend with only two central midfielders, meaning Kulusevski had licence to run through the centre and work closer to Solanke (below).

Spurs continued to make chances throughout the second period, eventually adding a third from a corner, but should really have added more. Nonetheless, they came away as buoyed by their performance as Manchester United were deflated.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice

Any win in a north London derby is welcome for the victors, but Arsenal’s victory here at Tottenham was particularly pleasing for the visiting side. Missing first-team regulars Martin Ødegaard and Declan Rice, Mikel Arteta’s team nonetheless put in a clinical, determined display to ensure they took three points. It was a game in which Tottenham had plenty of possession, but could not find a way to pierce Arsenal’s solid set-up.

Under the guidance of set-piece coach Nicolas Jover, Arsenal were the Premier League’s most prolific converters of set-pieces last season, scoring 22 goals (excluding penalties). Spurs, by contrast, conceded 16 goals from set-pieces in the last campaign. So it was perhaps no surprise when Arsenal defender Gabriel rose to power home a header on 64 minutes, losing Cristian Romero as he decisively met Bukayo Saka’s corner. Arteta is now the first Arsenal manager to win three consecutive league games away at Tottenham since George Graham in 1988.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have dug deeper into the tactics behind the victory.

How the managers saw it

“We’ve controlled the game, we’ve played in the right areas, we just didn’t execute again in that final third like we should have,” said Tottenham manager Ange Postecoglou. “We had some good chances, we had opportunities to create more good chances. And then we switched off for a set-piece, and you pay the price.”

“We had moments in the game, some really good ones, some others that we have to suffer,” said Arteta. “We suffered because we have to adapt a little bit the plan because of the players we had available. I wanted to press much higher, lose the ball in much better conditions, higher up the pitch. What I didn’t want to do – with certain players that we had missing today – is expose ourselves to a game that they [Tottenham] are incredibly good at.”

Spurs against Arsenal’s low block

Tottenham’s 4-3-3 included a very attacking front unit, with James Maddison and Dejan Kulusevski in the central spaces ahead of single pivot Rodrigo Bentancur. Brennan Johnson and Pedro Porro attacked from the right, with Son Heung-min and Destiny Udogie on the left. Dominic Solanke operated as the single centre-forward, against Arsenal’s compact, out-of-possession 4-4-2 low block.

Spurs initially tried to connect through the centre, often forcing attacks against a particularly narrow Arsenal midfield. The home side maintained width through Son and Johnson, with their full-backs supporting slightly inside (below). But they failed to make the inside-channel runs to expose Ben White and Jurriën Timber when the Arsenal full-backs pressed their wingers, with Maddison in particular sat deeper than the hosts perhaps needed him.

Unable to penetrate the Arsenal block, Maddison’s position deepened further. The double pivot he effectively formed with Bentancur helped cover central areas against any Arsenal counter-attack, but it meant one of Tottenham’s best attackers between the lines was very deep (below).

The hosts used more players on their right side, with Kulusevski remaining between the lines for longer, and Cristian Romero stepping in from right centre-back. This briefly left Timber exposed, but Spurs lacked the delivery to create. Instead, they were most dangerous when Arsenal made errors in their build-up.

Arsenal pressed higher for a period in the second half, but reverted back to a low block after taking the lead. Postecoglou responded by making changes, bringing on Timo Werner and Wilson Odobert in the wide areas. This allowed Son to narrow, but to little effect as Arsenal’s appetite to defend – evident in their wingers’ work rates – was outstanding.

Although limited in attack, Arsenal’s narrow midfield helped protect the back line. The wingers were rarely caught outside of the ball, and instead often protected the inside shoulder of their full-back. The Gunners’ front-line pairing positioned themselves deep to offer extra central cover; this allowed the pivots to severely reduce the space between the lines (below).

Arsenal’s directness

With the ball, Arsenal converted into a 4-2-3-1 from their 4-4-2 low block. Throughout the first half they focused on defending deep, and were happy to operate with reduced possession. The visitors simply played for territory and set-pieces, looking to counter-attack from deep in the opening 45 minutes. In the few moments they attempted to build, they were caught out. As a result, they swiftly reverted to a direct build-up.

The wide areas were key to Arsenal, as they looked for runs beyond from Saka and Gabriel Martinelli (below). Leandro Trossard moved wide, to link with and support their penetrative runs. In midfield, Jorginho and Thomas Partey rarely advanced forward, instead ready to land on any second balls the front line failed to secure.

Kai Havertz was Arsenal’s main target with their direct play. He dropped away from the Spurs centre-backs to flick on or secure the ball. Trossard supported underneath, with the double pivot rarely moving ahead. Whichever side Arsenal targeted, the opposite winger narrowed to get inside the Tottenham centre-back who hadn’t engaged Havertz. This allowed for penetration beyond; should Havertz successfully win the first contact, the winger closest to him was a threat on the outside (below). While this direct play failed to yield good chances, it did help Arsenal progress up the pitch. This reduced Tottenham’s momentum and helped them win dangerous set-pieces.

Arteta’s tweaks

In the second half, Arsenal went less direct and attempted to build more with short passes. Havertz dropped very deep – almost attacking as a number eight – as Partey and Jorginho readjusted. With Spurs attempting to press high, Arsenal drew in their front line, which in turn meant one of Tottenham’s full-backs jumped to support the press. Trossard’s movements worked opposite to Havertz, with Martinelli and Saka further stretching Spurs’ back line of three. Underlapping runs from Timber on Arsenal’s left then exploited Porro’s high positioning on the Tottenham right (below), allowing the visitors to progress the ball into dangerous areas.

The positioning of Havertz in the second half also involved dropping into the right inside channel, with Partey and Jorginho again readjusting. When the Spurs back line was set, and not drawn in to support a high press, Havertz delayed his dropping. When he did drop, he pulled his centre-back marker with him, again creating gaps for Arsenal to exploit. However, White’s more reserved performance on Arsenal’s right didn’t complement these movements as much as Timber’s did on the left, thus limiting any right-sided attacks.

Gabriel’s goal duly gave Arsenal a platform to revert to a low block, as they no longer looked to rotate and play more expansively. It was a statement win by Arteta’s team, and a confidence boost ahead of their next Premier League game. That, of course, is the small matter of a visit to their recent nemesis, Manchester City.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice

ARCHIE GRAY

Tottenham Hotspur, 2024-

The fact that Tottenham spent in the region of £30m to sign an 18-year-old says plenty about how highly rated Archie Gray is. He may have joined Ange Postecoglou’s Spurs while still a teenager, but his performances for Leeds United prior to his transfer displayed a maturity beyond his years.

Born in Durham in 2006, Gray comes from a family with plenty of football pedigree, not least where Leeds are concerned. He is the son of former Leeds player and Scotland international, Andy Gray; and both his grandad, Frank, and great uncle, Eddie, played for iconic Leeds teams managed by Don Revie. His three younger brothers, meanwhile, have all played for the club’s academy.

At the age of just 15, Archie was selected as a substitute by Marcelo Bielsa, but had to wait until he was 17 to make his debut for the first team. He went on to make 55 appearances for Leeds in all competitions in his first senior campaign, as well as winning two England Under-21 caps. Then Tottenham came calling for a player Postecoglou has described as “intelligent”.

Ahead of his first Premier League season, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Archie Gray’s time with Leeds United, including analysis of the positions he has featured in.

Technical analysis

Gray played mostly as a right-back for Leeds, with some outings in central midfield. No matter the position he played, though, defensive duelling and 1v1 defending were important parts of his game.

Spending most of the 2023/24 season as a full-back meant he naturally covered and protected from the wide areas. Where possible, he liked to get touch-tight to his opponent, and was very good at predicting passes into wide opponents. He was also adept at recognising straight passes into an opposing winger; from there, his aggression and tight marking stopped opponents from turning. This enabled him to limit forward play and protect the wide areas.

However, when the distance to his opponent was too big – or his specific winger opponent was particularly proficient at turning or spinning off one touch – then this aggressive jump could be worked around. His area of the pitch was then left exposed, or not defended as efficiently as it could have been.

When Gray did manage his distances well and it was appropriate to lunge at the ball – or duel, tussle or compete for possession – he did so with strength and confidence. He was just as effective when engaging with the ball in his own half, in a traditional full-back manner, as he was when pressing high up the pitch (below), which is ideal for the various strategies and moments that arise in a game.

When supporting a press, Gray used the touchline well to force play around. At Leeds, he curved his approach to the ball outwards, using his explosive push-off, especially from a standing start. Over relatively short distances, he jumped out of line to press and duel, limiting the time the opposition had to play forward.

When operating in a covering role – or a secondary defensive position, supporting a teammate applying pressure on the ball – Gray was disciplined in tracking opposing runs and movements. His appearances in central midfield were helpful, here. When playing in midfield he came up against penetrative movements – usually a number-eight run – inside a full-back committed to pressing (below).

Gray’s experience of tracking this type of run likely sharpened his awareness of the importance of tracking and covering this particular area of the pitch. It should also mean he recognises additional details on how to approach the ball, as the full-back committing to jump out, when defending against this common pattern of play.

In possession

Gray is an accomplished passer, especially when looking to play forward. He has a high passing rate into the final third, which requires teammates to make forward runs, or to be positioned against, between or around the opposing back line. When needed, he can switch the ball well, but his best passing attribute has been exploiting the space inside the opposition’s left-back.

Targeting the gap between the centre-back and full-back requires both precision and timing. Gray demonstrated this in his breakout season, with deft through balls, clipped, bending passes over, and well-timed punched passes with speed and directness that found narrowed runners in behind (below).

Not only was the detail usually very good on these passes, but the variety he demonstrated allowed for differing runs from teammates and positions. Narrowed wingers, advancing central midfielders and withdrawn centre-forwards all benefited from this particular pass from Gray, while his team gained territory up the pitch.

Full-back

Within Leeds United’s 4-2-3-1 shape, Gray would often move high during build-up, usually ending in line with – and sometimes higher than – his double-pivot teammates. Ahead, the nine and 10 pairing of Georginio Rutter and Joël Piroe rotated, often performing well-timed opposite movements. One would look to penetrate in behind the opposing back line, stretching and pushing them deeper. This provided Gray with a central run beyond, where he could clip balls over, or slide them around the opposing centre-backs. This particular run also created more room for those between the lines, allowing Gray to reverse delicate passes back inside, finding the deeper of the two central attackers. Although this pass was effective, Gray could certainly do this more in the coming years.

The narrowed wingers also allowed Gray to connect with passes back inside, as right wingers Dan James or Wilfried Gnonto worked inwards, off the ball, to receive at feet. Alternatively, due to their pace and acceleration, Gray could use his forward passing to exploit the space inside the opposing left-back (below).

With these passing options, Gray delivered the fourth-highest number of passes into the final third for Leeds in 2023/24. He was fifth-highest for losing possession, but given it was his first year in senior football, and he was brave with trying to play forward, that was to be expected.

Without the ball, Gray supported James and Gnonto’s pressing in the wide areas, always willing to back them up and support from underneath. He understood when to pass on his man to the central defence – Ethan Ampadu and Joe Rodon – so that he could fully commit and join a high press. Gray’s defensive presence high up the pitch allowed Leeds to apply regular pressure in the opponent’s half, with the second-lowest PPDA in the 2023/24 Championship. Supported and covered by the double pivot of Ilia Gruev and Glen Kamara, Gray’s defensive support from wide right played its part in Leeds reaching the playoff final.

Central midfield

Gray briefly appeared in central midfield for Leeds, either as part of the double pivot, or as the sole number 10 in the 4-2-3-1. Although he was naturally on the ball more when operating in the central spaces, what really stood out was his continued commitment to duelling, pressing, covering for teammates and his overall energy in the middle of the pitch.

As a result, Gray competed for the eighth-most defensive duels in the 2023/24 Championship, and the most for Leeds. As the 10 and as part of the double pivot, his energy and commitment helped press the central spaces, but also counter-press in the moments they lost possession. Not only did Leeds average the third-highest possession in the division, but they were also the third-highest overall for challenge intensity. That statistic is a combination of duels, tackles and interceptions per minute of opposition possession.

To achieve such a high-possession/high-pressing style over a 46-game Championship season, multiple players needed to back each other up – especially in aggressive and intense moments when competing for possession. Supported by his pivot partner, Gray was aggressive in his pressing, limiting how much his direct opponent could get on the half-turn and play forward. He also showed this in his full-back role.

Further supported by narrow wingers and the dropping nine and/or 10, Gray was a solid part of Leeds’ central counter-pressing (above). When he won possession, he looked to exploit inside the opposition’s full-back and find the wingers, penetrating the inside channels.

Overall, it was a highly impressive first season at senior level for Gray. As he steps up to Premier League level, the challenges will increase. But it was only going to be a matter of time before he appeared in England’s top flight.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice